Editor's note: political scientist, orientalist Parviz Mullojanov (Tajikistan).
Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Central Asia comes at a rather ambiguous and complex period in the region's history, as well as the entire post-Soviet area. This period sees the peak of confrontation between Russia and the West, negatively impacting the economy of the region closely linked to Russia. Relations between China and the West are also strained, while Beijing is becoming more active internationally, trying to assume the role of another leading geopolitical player. In this situation, the countries of the region strive to balance their relations between various geopolitical centers, attempting to distance themselves from global conflicts and maintain political and economic stability.As a result, Xi Jinping's official visit to two Central Asian countries has attracted significant attention from the press and the expert community. Most reports on the visit are more informational, discussing its goals and objectives only in general terms, without analysis, and merely quoting official communiqués. The brevity of comments on the visit can be partly explained by the lack of reliable information about its real goals and objectives; most of the agenda and discussions will take place behind closed doors, and the list of issues is so vast that it is currently difficult to determine which ones will be the main focus. In other words, it is hard to say whether Xi Jinping's visit will be extraordinary or even significant in its results, or just another official trip to the region with discussions of some routine matters and issues.
Officially, Xi Jinping is arriving in Astana to participate in the 24th meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on July 4. He will also pay state visits to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan at the invitation of the presidents of these two countries. Thus, Xi Jinping's visits to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are scheduled outside the SCO meeting, indicating the special significance the Chinese side attaches to this part of the official protocol. Otherwise, Xi Jinping could simply meet both presidents on the sidelines of the summit, as usually happens during such international meetings.
It is possible that during the summit and visit, Xi Jinping plans to discuss China's cooperation plans for the next few years. It is known that after the summit in Astana, China will chair the SCO from 2024 to 2025 on a rotational basis. Thus, after seven years, China will once again assume the presidency of the SCO, which the Chinese side clearly attaches great importance to. China's global plans for this summit and the next two years are also indicated by the fact that UN Secretary-General António Guterres and leaders of several international organizations have been invited to the SCO meeting in Astana.
It is difficult to say what exactly China's plan for the development of the SCO under its chairmanship for the next two years is. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev mentioned "ambitious plans to further deepen multifaceted relations with China" in five main areas. These include deepening cooperation in the investment sphere, especially in agriculture, new energy, and automotive; increasing trade turnover between our countries, including diversifying trade structures and expanding the range of goods; further promoting the global One Belt, One Road initiative; enhancing cultural and humanitarian interactions, simplifying visa practices, mutually opening cultural centers, Lubans' Workshops, university branches, and continuously working to increase flights.
Of course, a significant part of the directions listed by Tokayev primarily reflects China's interests, which plays the leading role in relations with the region as a key investor and external player. The One Belt, One Road initiative is of particular importance to China and Xi Jinping personally. At the same time, in the context of the impending crisis in the Russian and post-Soviet economies, Central Asian countries need additional support and external investments, including from China, more than ever before.
Another important aspect likely to be discussed in Astana and Dushanbe is the issue of regional security. This includes internal threats arising from the deepening economic crisis and growing social tension, as well as external challenges, such as religious radicalism and extremism. Xi Jinping may also discuss the relationship with the Taliban, whose representatives appear on international platforms created by Russia and China more and more frequently. These negotiations may primarily involve the Tajik side, which traditionally distrusts the Taliban and the prospects of peaceful coexistence with them in the foreseeable future.
Overall, it seems that China and Russia intend to continue expanding the SCO in the coming years, presenting it as a possible geopolitical alternative to pro-Western integration models. It is possible that further expansion plans of the SCO will also be discussed during the summit and on its sidelines. However, it is difficult to say how much the SCO will expand in the coming years - already, there are more frequent claims that the SCO is allegedly losing its effectiveness with each new expansion and is "turning into a talking club."
In any case, Xi Jinping's visit to the region is indeed given great importance and even somewhat symbolic significance; it is no coincidence that President Tokayev recently stated in an interview with Xinhua that Kazakhstan and China are on the verge of a new "golden 30 years" of bilateral relations. At the same time, despite these loud statements, it is unlikely that any breakthrough agreements or treaties will be signed between the region's countries and China in the near future.
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